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This study presents a comparative analysis of post-decisional evaluations with 
reference to a choice made by the subject between an option with an antece-
dent that had a pleasurable finality while the alternative option was orientated 
respectively to the undertaking something useful, to fulfilling an obligation, 
or to the respect of a prior commitment with others. The study focalizes on a 
particular condition of the subject’s awareness; that is to say that the decision 
was made with a will to resist to the alternative option, or the knowledge that 
he has substantially chosen to succumb to the pressure exercised by the alter-
native option. The study showed such an awareness condition had a signifi-
cant effect on fundamental judgments that accompany and follow the deci-
sional act, i.e. the rating of the cost of the choice, the value attributed to the 
choice, the regret associated to the option renounced by the subject. 
 
Keywords 




Much of the past literature on decision making has focused on the condition of a 
subject faced with an evaluation of substantially homogeneous options (two or 
more consumer products, holiday destinations, a choice of postcards, the chance 
to earn money, etc.) (Cohen & Goldberg, 1970; Hui, & Molden, 2014; Sharot et 
al. 2009). The risk of the effects of cognitive overlap in situations of choice where 
the options have common attributes has already been investigated by several 
academics (Trump & Brucks, 2012; Brehm & Cohen, 1962), who state that the 
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cognitive overlap, both real or imagined, reduces the cognitive dissonance linked 
to the choice made, and therefore, lowers the level of difficulty and decisional 
cost for the subjects. Of course, the conceptual reference of this line of studies is 
the Model for Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 1957; 1964) regained and 
re-articulated in terms of mental fatigue also by Swait & Adamowicz, 2001; Basu 
& Savani, 2017, and Jonker et al., 2018. In the light of these observations, it 
would seem remarkable to give space to research that investigates human deci-
sional behaviour from a more naturalistic point of view and linked to the dy-
namics of the different contexts in which the subject happens to find himself in 
(Klein, 1998). From this point of view, it is more likely that the subject be en-
couraged towards an orientation between options that are substantially not 
equivalent (Friedman et al., 2018). For example, deciding to spend an evening 
with friends rather than getting down to finishing an urgent job; choosing to 
read a book in perfect relaxation rather than doing a work out in the gym, etc. 
This naturally follows the considerations already described by Johnson (1984) as 
he stressed the need to move from a hierarchical model of choice, related to the 
evaluation of “comparable alternatives” (for reference to the same attributes or 
qualities) to use valuation strategies implemented in relation to what he termed 
“un-comparable alternatives” (where comparability is the degree to which alter-
natives are described or represented by the same attributes) (see also Bettman et 
al., 1998). More recently, however, construal level theory (CLT) with a purely 
cognitive orientation has risen to the forefront, focusing on the level of con-
struals that receive greater attention or weight in evaluation (see Dhar & Kim, 
2007; Trope & Liberman, 2010). An emerging trend in this literature has been 
shifting from the consideration of single goal and isolated choice settings to sce-
narios where people pursue multiple goals through a sequence of choices. For 
example, Fishbach and Dhar (2005) found that when in the presence of multiple 
competing goals, people can either opt to behave in ways that are consistent with 
a goal or behave in ways that disengage from one goal in favor of an alternate 
goal. It depends on whether an initial action is interpreted in terms of goal 
commitment or goal progress. An interesting question is regarding the set of 
factors that can determine whether a specific action is interpreted in terms of 
goal progress or goal commitment (Fishbach et al., 2006). The study we are pre-
senting here is focused on the condition in which the subject has previously 
formulated his intention (first option) and then subsequently re-evaluated his 
choice in the light of a new stimulus/temptation (second option). For example, 
the subject intended to rest but was then encouraged to go out with a friend. 
This situation could be related to the Model of Pre-decisional Conflict as illu-
strated by Costanzo (2013), who underlines its influence on the decisions of 
consumer purchasing. From a post-decision perspective we believe that it may 
be appropriate to underline that the subject’s decision could evolve under two 
different psychological conditions, both influential in a different way. The first 
condition could be defined as the subject’s resistance, in that he performs his de-
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cisional act with an attitude of “resistance”: when evaluating the options he tests 
the first hypothesis by comparing its validity with the second option. The second 
condition could be defined as the subject’s exposition to succumb. In this case he 
accompanies the decisional act with an initial attitude of willingness towards the 
stimuli/encouragement emanating from the option: the subject does not try to 
evade the influence emanating from the option. It is also useful to distinguish 
the evaluation that the subject makes after having completed his decisional act. 
On this level it would be feasible for the subject to consider if the result of the 
decision was due to an act of resistance or succumbing to a temptation/option. 
In the literature the question of resistance in choosing has been mostly asso-
ciated to the question of temptation, potentially more attractive and more re-
munerative than the first option. Resisting or failing, in this sense, therefore 
succumbing, calls upon certain aspects linked to the control of impulses, inhibi-
tion skills, attention control, the regulation of affections (Baumeister & Hea-
therton, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Hoffmann & Trautmann, 2008; Ent et 
Baumeister, 2014). In the case of temptation we are presented with two opposi-
tion strategies: resist when faced directly with the source of the temptation or 
deliberately try to avoid contact. In our study the antecedent is pleasurable for 
the subject while the options can be either equivalent or structurally different. In 
the first case (the equally pleasurable option) there will obviously be less disson-
ance than the other options. The innovative aspect of our contribution is in the 
evaluation of how the subject’s final judgment changes when an originally hedo-
nistic and intrinsically rewarding position (intention) becomes questionable. 
Once the decisional action is concluded, both in the case where the conse-
quences of the course of action undertaken are immediately clear to the subject, 
and in the case where these are only present in terms of expectations, then the 
final area of post-decisional evaluation comes into play (Svenson et al., 2009; Sa-
lo & Svenson, 2001; Svenson, 2006; Krosch et al., 2012). The prevalent literature 
on this subject has investigated above all a level of evaluation associated with the 
feeling of regret, that is to say, the level of regret/remorse that follows the deci-
sion taken and associated with thinking about the option not taken or which has 
been renounced (Kahneman, 1994; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; Gilbert et al., 
2004; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2005; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007; Seta et al., 2008; 
Beike et al., 2009; Raeva et al., 2010; Marcatto & Ferrante, 2012; Wilson & Gil-
bert, 2005).  
A second component of post-decisional evaluation relative to the estimate of 
the decisional cost (indicated in literature prevalently as cognitive effort) for the 
subject, who has to orientate his intentional and behavioural route starting from 
a specific contextual condition and structured in accordance with a specific level 
of structural dissonance (pleasure/pleasure; pleasure/utility; pleasure/obligation; 
pleasure/commitment). I.e. whereas the first option is alternately confronted 
with a condition considered equally pleasant, or useful, or perceived as an obli-
gation, or related to commitments undertaken with other people. As reported by 
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Park et al. (2015), previous decision making literature defined cognitive effort as 
an internal information search effort, such as the use of working memory or 
performing mental calculation without any external aid. For example, one 
common way to manipulate cognitive effort is to vary the size of the choice set in 
a decision task (e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Sagi & Friedland, 2007). Further 
studies proposed to use a broader definition of cognitive effort as the total cog-
nitive resources used in the decision process (e.g., Russo & Dosher, 1983), which 
may be derived from both internal and external information search and overall 
time spent (e.g., Garbarino & Edell, 1997). Moreover an articulated model of 
post-decisional evaluation cannot neglect to consider a third factor: an estimate 
of the value attributed by the subject to the decision made (Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1981; Kahneman et al., 1990; Shamoun & Svenson, 2002; Schwartz et al., 
2002; Higgins, 2006; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). In the literature, the value of 
the choice is based prevalently on an evaluation of the total balance of the “utili-
ty” of the attributes associated to the single options (vd. Multi-Attribute Utility 
Theory, MAUT; Adams & Fagot, 1959; Edwards et al., 1975; Keeney & Raiffa, 
1976; Hammond et al., 1999). Mellers & Cooke (1994) had already illustrated 
how the evaluation of the value is a dynamic and not a rigid process, so even mi-
nimal changes of perspective can influence judgment and therefore determine 
fluctuations in the rating of values/utility attributed to the single or group pre-
dicates.  
For the purposes of the present work, we have mainly referred to Fishbach 
and Dhar’s Construal Level Theory (CLT, 2005) considering scenarios where 
people pursue multiple goals through a sequence of choices. We assumed that it 
was for the most likely and frequent subjects in everyday life the condition of 
choosing between paths of action related to different domains/goals (for exam-
ple, preferring something pleasant over obtaining a utility, or giving up pleasure 
in the name of a higher duty or not to disappoint the expectations of a reference 
group). The first hypothesis was therefore for us to verify to what extent the goal 
of an alternative action could influence the judgments of cost, value and regret 
inherent in the chosen course of action. A further consideration guided the con-
struction of the study, namely that in a dynamic decision-making process the 
evaluation of alternatives is not always simultaneous and parallel, but often 
temporally disjointed, so it is plausible to believe that at first the subject formu-
lates a certain intention of choice, on the basis of certain pressures and context 
assessments, and that in a second moment, a change of perspective or a specific 
external induction pushes him to question the first formulation of intention, and 
to reach a final decision that reaffirms the initial will or modifies the outcome in 
favor of the new alternative. 
Our second hypothesis was therefore that post-decisional evaluation of a 
choice between alternatives may also be affected by a specific level of awareness 
of the subject, i.e. recognizing that in the end they have resisted the alternative 
temptation/induction or have “given in” and had to give up the first intention.  
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So in synthesis the main research objective of our study was to understand 
whether post-decisional judgments (i.e., the cost of the decision, the estimation 
of the value attributed to the choice, and the regret associated with the waived 
option) would vary significantly, within contexts that held a second option in 
(goal) dissonance with the original intention of the subject, considering also the 
special condition of awareness that may accompany the decision-making process 
between competing alternatives, i.e., the awareness of having eventually resisted 
the alternative or having succumbed to it. 
2. Methods  
2.1. Participants  
201 university Students with average age = 22.90; DS = 3.23; Males = 93 (46.3%); 
Females = 108 (53.7%) have been randomly selected from among all those 
enrolled and attending the courses of Economics, Philosophy, Communication 
and Education (total students number: 420). The sample size determination was 
made by setting a 1-alpha confidence level at 95%, therefore with z normal value 
at the confidence level of 1.96. The following two formulas were applied, where 
the second operated the correction for small populations (<20,000): 1) Xo = z2 (p 
* q)/b2, with p as the proportion to be estimated and q the proportion of com-
plementary character and b the desired precision set at 5%. Hence: 3.842 (0.46 × 
0.54)/0.0025 = 381.72; 2) X = Xo/[1 + (Xo/pop)], with pop the numerical value of 
the reference population. Hence: 381.72/[1 + (381.72/420)] = 200. Tools admin-
istration took place upon release and signing of the form for an informed con-
sent of participation in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.  
2.2. Procedure and Instruments  
The study protocol envisaged proposing to the participants in succession four 
scenarios, in which a choice of action aimed at obtaining a pleasant condition 
was presented, subsequently questioned by a second alternative, respectively 
equally pleasant in the outcome (first scenario), aimed at achieving a utility 
(second scenario), aimed at fulfilling an obligation (third scenario), aimed at 
meeting the expectations of a group (fourth scenario). Decision-making scena-
rios reproducing situations from everyday life were defined through a prelimi-
nary processing and selection procedure conducted by a group of 50 undergra-
duate students who first identified 15 action choices aimed to be pleasant, 8 
aimed to be useful, 9 perceived as an obligation, 10 related to commitments un-
dertaken with other people. Subsequently, at each situation, students rated a 
score from 1 to 7 to indicate the degree of representativeness of each specific 
condition. Considering the higher scores obtained, two conditions of pleasure, 
one of utility, one of obligation and one of commitment were ultimately selected 
for the protocol. Table 1 shows the sequence of the four goal comparisons pre-
sented through the scenarios.  
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Table 1. Competing action objectives in the identification scenarios. 
Table 1 First Action Choice Second Action Choice 
First Scenario Pleasant Goal Pleasant goal 
Second Scenario Pleasant Goal Useful Goal 
Third Scenario Pleasant Goal Goal of Obligation 
Fourth Scenario Pleasant Goal 
Goal of Compliance 
with Expectations 
 
In the first scenario the pleasurable condition was confronted with an alterna-
tive option of equal valence: the temptation even presented the same kind of 
pleasurable outcome should the subjects decide to choose it: “You intend to go 
for a relaxing, late afternoon walk. You receive a phone call from a friend who 
informs you that at exactly that time there will be your favorite film on TV”. In 
the second scenario the pleasurable condition was confronted with an alternative 
whose outcome would lead to a useful acquisition for the subjects: “You realize 
that the fridge is empty and tomorrow the shops will be shut because it’s a bank 
holiday”. In the third scenario the subjects had to decide between the pleasurable 
condition and an alternative linked to an obligation: “Your mother reminds you 
that you have to tidy your room in the afternoon because there are guests arriv-
ing for dinner”. Finally, in the fourth scenario the subjects were invited to con-
front with an alternative option associated to a previously made commitment in 
favor of other subjects: “You remember that you committed yourself to prepar-
ing a report for a group project to hand in to your professor the following day”.  
Each scenario presented two possible outcomes: 1) Resisting the alternative 
option while remaining firm with the first program (pleasant situation); 2) Suc-
cumbing to the pressure of the alternative.  
Subjects were asked to read each scenario as far as possible identifying conse-
cutively with both expected outcomes (resist and succumb to the alternative). 
Later on, for each single condition (resist/succumb) and scenario the subjects 
were invited to express their post-decisional evaluations articulated in three 
items using a five point Likert Scale. The first item asked the subject to express 
an evaluation of the “cost” attributed to the decision made, or rather to the esti-
mated effort needed to resist or succumb to the option. The second item asked 
the subject to give a rating in terms of the “subjective value” attributed to the 
choice made in the two conditions. The third item asked the subject to indicate a 
measure of “regret” or distress, intended as persistent thinking about the non 
chosen option.  
For ex.  
A (resist): You intend to go for a relaxing, late afternoon walk but you re-
member that you committed yourself to preparing a report for a group project to 
hand in to your professor the following day. Despite the prior commitment 
you don’t change your mind. 
- From 1 to 5, how much would it have cost you to maintain your initial inten-
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tion? 
- What value from 1 to 5 would you have attributed to not changing your 
mind? 
- After your choice, from 1 to 5, how long would you have kept thinking about 
the alternative option? 
B (succumb): You intend to go for a relaxing, late afternoon walk but you 
remember that you committed yourself to preparing a report for a group project 
to hand in to your professor the following day. You change your mind and de-
cide to keep your prior commitment so as not to disappoint your group.  
- From 1 to 5, how much would it have cost you to modify your initial inten-
tion? 
- What value from 1 to 5 would you have attributed to the fact that you 
changed your mind? 
- After your choice, from 1 to 5, how long would you have kept thinking about 
the alternative option? 
3. Statistical Analysis  
The data were processed using the statistical software SPSS version 22. Since the 
objective was to measure the change in the estimates of cost, value and regret 
(dependent variables) after the sequential administration of the four identifica-
tion scenarios, within-subjects Repeated Measures Anova were carried out using 
the Generalized Linear Model procedure. The analyses were carried out sepa-
rately for the resistance and succumbing versions provided for by the protocol. 
The four scenarios were then inserted as stimulus factor levels within the sub-
jects. The average of the estimate of cost, value and regret, associated with the 
choice with which the participants made the identification, represented the de-
pendent variables analyzed. Assumptions considered for Repeated Measures 
ANOVA were Normality (the test variables follow a multivariate normal distri-
bution in the population) and Sphericity (the variances of all difference scores 
among the test variables must be equal in the population). If p > 0.05 at Mauch-
ley’s test, Sphericity could be assumed. Where the assumption was not met, has 
been used the p-value from the Greenhouse-Geisser correction row. The com-
parison of marginal means was made using Sidak’s correction method. Pearson r 
correlation and Omega-squared (ω2) have been used as values of the effect size. 
According to Cohen (1988, 1992), for Pearson’s r the effect size is low if the val-
ue of r varies around 0.1, medium if r varies around 0.3, and large if r varies 
more than 0.5; while Field (2013) suggested for Omega Squared the following 
interpretation heuristics: 0 - 0.01: a very small effect; 0.01 - 0.06: small effect; 
0.06 - 0.14: medium effect; > 0.14: large effect. 
4. Results 
Table 2 reports the main descriptive statistics of dependent variables (Value, 
Cost, Regret) differentiated according to the decision-making scenario and the 
identification condition (resistance and succumbing). 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of dependent variables. 
 
N Mean SD Ske Kur 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic SE Statistic SE 
First Scenario 
Pleasant/Pleasant 
Value (R) 201 3.31 1.214 −.239 .172 −.750 .341 
Cost (R) 201 2.86 1.274 .113 .172 −1.047 .341 
Regret (R) 201 2.62 1.291 .309 .172 −.928 .341 
Value (S) 201 3.27 1.284 −.214 .172 −.957 .341 
Cost (S) 201 2.76 1.267 .275 .172 −.931 .341 
Regret (S) 201 2.57 1.283 .280 .172 −.993 .341 
Second Scenario 
Pleasant/Useful 
Value (R) 201 2.96 1.401 .113 .172 −1.212 .341 
Cost (R) 201 3.21 1.373 −.184 .172 −1.213 .341 
Regret (R) 201 3.16 1.428 −.209 .172 −1.237 .341 
Value (S) 201 3.78 1.308 −.751 .172 −.624 .341 
Cost (S) 201 2.72 1.321 .365 .172 −.993 .341 
Regret (S) 201 2.70 1.357 .277 .172 −1.106 .341 
Third Scenario 
Pleasant/Obligation 
Value (R) 201 2.97 1.365 −.056 .172 −1.185 .341 
Cost (R) 201 2.93 1.325 .064 .172 −1.075 .341 
Regret (R) 201 2.96 1.385 .015 .172 −1.218 .341 
Value (S) 201 3.72 1.258 −.724 .172 −.481 .341 
Cost (S) 201 3.18 1.316 −.172 .172 −1.038 .341 
Regret (S) 201 3.01 1.360 −.018 .172 −1.115 .341 
Fourth Scenario 
Pleasant/Commitment 
Value (R) 201 3.00 1.453 −.010 .172 −1.221 .341 
Cost (R) 201 3.59 1.305 −.545 .172 −.790 .341 
Regret (R) 201 3.70 1.309 −.639 .172 −.737 .341 
Value (S) 201 3.70 1.372 −.658 .172 −.858 .341 
Cost (S) 201 2.95 1.312 .088 .172 −1.003 .341 
Regret (S) 201 2.69 1.287 .262 .172 −.918 .341 
Legend: R = Condition of Resistance; S = Condition of Succumbing; SD = Standard Deviation; SE = Stan-
dard Error; Ske = Skewness; Ku = Kurtosis. 
 
Regarding the normality assumption, values showed some kurtosis but noth-
ing too alarming (<1.3). The preliminary verifications of the assumptions ex-
cluded the presence of multivariate outliers. Mardia’s multivariate kurtosis index 
(23.56) was in fact below the critical value p (p + 2) = 24; so the relationship be-
tween the variables can be considered substantially linear. Low co-linearity was 
indicated by the low VIF values (Variance Inflaction Factor) <2 and high toler-
ance values > .60. For verification of the assumptions on the residuals, the aver-
age between the standardized and raw residuals was equal to 0; the 
Durbin-Watson test had a value of 1.94 and was therefore indicative of the ab-
sence of autocorrelation.  
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First was evaluated the cost factor of the decision for the four levels (scena-
rios) in the condition of resistance. Given that Mauchly’s test was not significant 
(Sig. .124), the condition for sphericity was verified, χ2 (5) = 1.698, p = .889. The 
effect of the repeated measurements was significant. F(3, 600) = 15.455; p = .000; 
r = .27; ω2 = .04. Has been then compared the marginal averages with the Sidak 
correction method (see Figure 1). 
From the analysis emerged that estimated mean of cost when the alternative 
option was also a pleasurable choice resulted significantly lower than both the 
choices when the alternative was an option of utility for the subject (p = .024) 
and when was an option concerning a prior commitment with others (p = .000) 
(see Table 3). When the resistance in a pleasurable choice was compared to a 
utility option, the cost of this resistance was significantly lower when the alter-
native is a prior commitment with others (p = .007). When the resistance in the 
pleasurable choice was compared with an option of obligation for the subject, 
the cost of the resistance was significantly lower than the situation in which the 
alternative was a prior commitment with others (p = .000). The cost of resis-
tance was maximum when the alternative option was a prior commitment 
and was significantly high when it presented characteristics of utility for the 
subject. The cost of the resistance was lower when the alternative was 
equally pleasurable or when it presented an obligation for the subject. In 
order to improve the comparison was also performed a planned comparison 
adopting the reverse Helmert Contrast method (Difference) concentrating on 
the resistance to a prior commitment (level four). The comparison with the oth-
er levels presented a significant F test: F(1, 200) = 38.994 with p = .000, verifying 
power equal to 1.000 (computed using alpha = .05) and an r-effect size equal 
to .40. 
 
Table 3. Pairwise Comparison of Cost in condition of Resistance. 
(I) (J) MD SE p BCa 95% CI 
1 
2 −.353* .121 .024 [−.68, −.03] 
3 −.075 .125 .992 [−.41, .26] 
4 −.736* .117 .000 [−1.05, −.42] 
2 
1 .353* .121 .024 [.11, .59] 
3 .279 .118 .112 [.04, .51] 
4 −.383* .117 .007 [−.61, −.15] 
3 
1 .075 .125 .992 [−.26, .41] 
2 −.279 .118 .112 [−.59, .04] 
4 −.662* .121 .000 [−.98, −.34] 
4 
1 .736* .117 .000 [.42,1 .05] 
2 .383* .117 .007 [.07, .69] 
3 .662* .121 .000 [.34, .98] 
Table legend: MD = difference of means; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval; ps < .05. 
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Figure 1. Estimated Marginal Means of Cost Judgments in condition of Resistance. 
 
Secondly, was evaluated the cost factor of the decision for the four levels (sce-
narios) in the condition of succumbing. Seeing as Mauchly’s test was not signif-
icant, the condition of sphericity is verified, χ2 (5) = 4.967, p = .420; epsilon 
Greenhouser-Geisser = .933. The effect of the repeated measurements was sig-
nificant. F(3, 600) = 6.773; p = .000; r = .18; ω2 = .02. Has been then performed 
the comparisons between the marginal averages with the Sidak correction me-
thod (see Figure 2). 
The cost of succumbing to an obligation was significantly higher than the cost 
attributed to succumbing to a choice with an alternative option of pleasure (p 
= .002) or utility for the subject (p = .001). The cost of succumbing to a situation 
of obligation resulted not significantly higher than succumbing to a prior com-
mitment (p = .159). Succumbing to a prior commitment didn’t give a significant 
value higher than the costs recorded for succumbing to pleasure or utility (p 
= .531 and p = .280). Succumbing to an obligation presented cost levels 
higher than those for succumbing to pleasure or utility. To improve the 
comparison we made a planned comparison adopting the reverse Helmert Con-
trast method (Difference). The comparison with the previous levels presented a 
significant F test: F(1, 200) = 18.735 with p = .000, verifying power equal to .98 
(computed using alpha = .05) and an r-effect size equal to .28 (see Table 4). 
Was then evaluated the value factor of the decision for the four levels (scena-
rios) in the condition of resistance. Seeing as Mauchly’s test was significant 
(Sig. .000), and the condition of sphericity was not verified, χ2 (5) = 23.428, has 
been considered the effect of the repeated measurements using the Green-
house-Geisser correction which resulted significant F(2.799, 559.81) = 3.870; p 
= .01; r = .14 ω2 = .009. Was then compared the marginal averages using the Si-
dak correction method (see Figure 3). 
The value attributed to a choice of resistance when the alternative option 
is equally pleasurable was significantly higher (.001) than the other situa-
tions in which the alternatives were a utility (.003) and an obligation (.03). 
(See Table 5) In order to improve the comparison we made a planned compar-
ison adopting the reverse Helmert Contrast method (Difference). The compari-
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= .000, with verifying power equal to .93 (computed using alpha = .05), and an 
r-effect size of .24.  
 
 
Figure 2. Estimated Marginal Means of Cost Judgments in condition of Succumbing. 
 
 
Figure 3. Estimated Marginal Means of Value Judgments in condition of Resistance. 
 
Table 4. Pairwise Comparison of Cost in condition of Succumbing. 
(I) (J) MD SE p BCa 95% CI 
1 
2 .040 .114 1.000 [−.26, .34] 
3 −.428* .118 .002 [−.74, − .11] 
4 −.189 .121 .531 [−.51, .13] 
2 
1 −.040 .114 1.000 [−.34, .26] 
3 −.468* .118 .001 [−.78, −.15] 
4 −.229 .118 .280 [−.54, .08] 
3 
1 .428* .118 .002 [.11, .74] 
2 .468* .118 .001 [.15, .78] 
4 .239 .108 .159 [−.05, .53] 
4 
1 .189 .121 .531 [−.13, .51] 
2 .229 .118 .280 [−.08, .54] 
3 −.239 .108 .159 [−.53, .05] 



















































P. Diotaiuti et al. 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/psych.2020.112016 256 Psychology 
 
Table 5. Pairwise Comparison of Value in condition of Resistance. 
(I) (J) MD SE p BCa 95% CI 
1 
2 .353* .100 .003 [.08, .62] 
3 .343* .122 .032 [.02, .67] 
4 .308 .135 .131 [− .05, .67] 
2 
1 −.353* .100 .003 [−.62, −.09] 
3 −.010 .119 1.000 [−.33, .31] 
4 −.045 .122 .999 [−.37, .28] 
3 
1 −.343* .122 .032 [−.67, −.02] 
2 .010 .119 1.000 [−.31, .33] 
4 −.035 .125 1.000 [−.37, .30] 
4 
1 −.308 .135 .131 [−.67, .05] 
2 .045 .122 .999 [−.28, .37] 
3 .035 .125 1.000 [−.30, .37] 
Table legend: MD = difference of means; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval; ps < .05. 
 
Was then evaluated the value factor of the decision for the four levels (scena-
rios) in the condition of succumbing. Since Mauchly’s test was not significant 
(Sig. .196), the condition of sphericity was verified, χ2 (5) = 7.350. The effect for 
the repeated measurements was significant. F(3, 600) = 8.488; Sig. .000; r = .20; 
ω2 = .02. Has been made comparisons between the marginal averages using the 
Sidak correction method (see Figure 4). 
When the subject succumbed to an alternative that was equally pleasura-
ble the value attributed to the choice was significantly less than the other 
conditions where the subject succumbed to options of utility (p = .000), ob-
ligation (p = .000) and prior commitment (p = .004). (See Table 6) To im-
prove the comparison has been made a planned comparison adopting the re-
verse Helmert contrast (Difference). The comparison with the other levels pre-
sented a significant F test. F(1, 200) = 22.258, p = .000, with verifying power 
equal to .99 (computed using alpha = .05), and an r-effect size of .32.  
Was then evaluated the regret factor of the decision for the four levels (scena-
rios) in the condition of resistance. Since Mauchly’s test was not significant 
(Sig. .146), the condition of sphericity was verified, χ2 (5) = 8.197. The effect of 
the repeated measurements was significant. F(3, 600) = 28.032; p = .000; r = .35; 
ω2 = .07. Has been made comparisons between the marginal averages using the 
Sidak correction method (see Figure 5). 
In the situation of resistance to an alternative, equally pleasurable option, 
the subject’s regret was significantly lower than the other conditions where 
the subject resisted to the different alternative options of utility (p = .000), 
obligation (p = .04) and prior commitment (p = .000) (see Table 7). 
In the situation of resistance to an alternative option of prior commit-
ment the estimated regret was significantly higher than all the other situa-
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tions of resistance, respectively to pleasure (p = .000), utility (p = .000) and 
obligation (p = .000).  
 
 
Figure 4. Estimated Marginal Means of Value Judgments in condition of Succumbing. 
 
 
Figure 5. Estimated Marginal Means of Regret Judgments in condition of Resistance. 
 
Table 6. Pairwise Comparison of Value in condition of Succumbing. 
(I) (J) MD SE p BCa 95% CI 
1 
2 −.512* .115 .000 [−.82, −.21] 
3 −.453* .111 .000 [−.75, −.16] 
4 −.428* .123 .004 [−.75, −.10] 
2 
1 .512* .115 .000 [.21, .82] 
3 .060 .114 .996 [−.24, .36] 
4 .085 .106 .965 [−.20, .37] 
3 
1 .453* .111 .000 [.16, .75] 
2 −.060 .114 .996 [−.36, .24] 
4 .025 .114 1.000 [−.28, .33] 
4 
1 .428* .123 .004 [.10, .75] 
2 −.085 .106 .965 [−.37, .20] 
3 −.025 .114 1.000 [−.33, .28] 
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Table 7. Pairwise Comparison of Regret in condition of Resistance. 
(I) (J) MD SE p BCa 95% CI 
1 
2 −.512* .115 .000 [−.82, −.21] 
3 −.453* .111 .000 [−.75, −.16] 
4 −.428* .123 .004 [−.75, −.10] 
2 
1 .512* .115 .000 [.21, .82] 
3 .060 .114 .996 [−.24, .36] 
4 .085 .106 .965 [−.20, .37] 
3 
1 .453* .111 .000 [.16, .75] 
2 −.060 .114 .996 [−.36, .24] 
4 .025 .114 1.000 [−.28, .33] 
4 
1 .428* .123 .004 [.10, .75] 
2 −.085 .106 .965 [−.37, .20] 
3 −.025 .114 1.000 [−.33, .28] 
Table legend: MD = difference of means; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval; ps < .05. 
 
To improve the comparison has been made a planned comparison adopting 
the reverse Helmert Contrast (Difference). The comparison with the other levels 
presented a significant F test. F(1, 200) = 59.886, p = .000, with verifying power 
equal to 1.00 (computed using alpha = .05), and an r-effect size of .48.  
Finally was evaluated the regret factor of the decision for the four levels (sce-
narios) in the condition of succumbing. Since Mauchly’s test was not significant 
(Sig. .421), the condition of sphericity was verified, χ2 (5) = .975. The effect of the 
repeated measurements was significant. F(3, 600) = 5.224; p = .001; r = .16; ω2 
= .01. Has been made comparisons between the marginal averages using the Si-
dak correction method (see Figure 6). 
In the situation of succumbing to an obligation, the subject’s regret was 
significantly higher than that found in the situations where the subject 
succumbed to options of equally pleasurable alternative (p = .002), and 
prior commitment (p = .02). (See Table 8) 
To improve the comparison has been made a planned comparison adopting 
the reverse Helmert Contrast (Difference). The comparison presented a signifi-
cant F test. F(1, 200) = 14.250, p = .000 with verifying power equal to .96 and an 
r-effect size of .25. 
Summarizing the main results above: 
- The cost of resistance was maximum when the alternative option was a prior 
commitment and was significantly high when it presented characteristics of 
utility for the subject (r-effect size = .40. 
- Succumbing to an obligation presented cost levels higher than those for suc-
cumbing to pleasure or utility (r-effect size = .28).  
- The value attributed to a choice of resistance when the alternative option is 
equally pleasurable was significantly higher than the other situations in 
which the alternatives were a utility and an obligation (r-effect size = .24).  
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Figure 6. Estimated Marginal Means of Regret Judgments in condition of Succumbing. 
 
Table 8. Pairwise Comparison of Regret in condition of Succumbing. 
(I) (J) MD SE p BCa 95% CI 
1 
2 −.134 .112 .795 [−.43, −.16] 
3 −.443* .123 .002 [−.77, −.12] 
4 −.119 .118 .896 [−.43, .19] 
2 
1 .134 .112 .795 [−.16, .43] 
3 −.308 .121 .067 [−.63, .01] 
4 .015 .115 1.000 [−.29, .32] 
3 
1 .443* .123 .002 [.12, .77] 
2 .308 .121 .067 [−.01, .63] 
4 .323* .112 .025 [.03, .62] 
4 
1 .119 .118 .896 [−.19, .43] 
2 −.015 .115 1.000 [.32, .29] 
3 −.323* .112 .025 [−.62, −.03] 
Table legend: MD = difference of means; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval; ps < .05. 
 
- When the subject succumbed to an alternative that was equally pleasurable 
the value attributed to the choice was significantly less than the other condi-
tions where the subject succumbed to options of utility, obligation and prior 
commitment (r-effect size = .32). 
- In the situation of resistance to an alternative option of prior commitment 
the estimated regret was significantly higher than all the other situations of 
resistance, respectively to pleasure, utility and obligation (r-effect size = .48). 
- In the situation of succumbing to an obligation, the subject’s regret was sig-
nificantly higher than that found in the situations where the subject suc-
cumbed to options of equally pleasurable alternative, and prior commitment 
(r-effect size = .25).  
5. Discussion 
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rios, investigating the conditions of resistance and succumbing separately.  
In the condition of resistance the higher cost for the subject was attributed to 
the renouncement of a utility and prior commitment option. For the latter has 
been registered the absolute highest cost ever, whereas, whenever the option was 
a situation that was equally pleasurable or an obligation, the subject evaluated 
the choice of renouncement by attributing a lower cost to the decision he has 
made. It is interesting to underline that the resistance to an obligation consti-
tuted a relatively easy choice for the subject, especially if we consider how much 
it would cost him to renounce a personal utility and even more so if he had to 
derogate an antecedent commitment (Zimmerman, 1986; Sousa, 2009; Vedder, 
2019; Tamminga & Hindriks, 2019).  
In the condition of succumbing we found, in regard to the scenario of obliga-
tion, a condition that was totally specular to the preceding one, where succumb-
ing to an obligation implied a very high cost for the subject compared to the al-
ternative (pleasurable and/or useful). This confirms the fact that in the confron-
tation between pleasure and obligation, the attractive force of pleasure manifests 
all its cogency. So choosing pleasure and therefore resisting an obligation is a 
much more natural attitude than the contrary. In this case the subject submits to 
the needs of the obligation with much difficulty and diffidence. Generally 
speaking, the plea to a moral obligation or an authority does not seem to be the 
best strategy for inducing subjects to activate themselves and renounce their po-
sition of peaceful hedonism and immediate gratification.  
As for the value ratings, we can see from the results that there was an inter-
esting specularity in both the conditions of resistance and succumbing when the 
alternative in question concerned two equally pleasurable conditions. In the case 
of resistance, the value attributed to this kind of choice was significantly higher 
than the others (utility, obligation and commitment); while in conditions of 
succumbing to another pleasurable condition, the value of this kind of choice 
was considered to be significantly lower than the other three confrontations. 
This result can be considered substantially in accordance with what has already 
been elucidated in Brehm’s research (1956) and in the numerous successive rep-
licas by other authors (Steele et al., 1993; Lydon, 1999; for a full list see Har-
mon-Jones & Mills, 1999). These studies confirmed that after having made a de-
cision, individuals often modify their preferences in order to align them as far as 
possible with the choice that they have just made. This applies both in condi-
tions of a real choice and in conditions of hypothetical choices, where there are 
no immediate consequences. This change of preferences has been observed 
above all in association with two alternatives that were previously considered 
equivalent (for example two holiday destinations). The classical interpretation of 
this known paradigm of free choice is that in these conditions the subjects are 
encouraged by reducing the tension produced by the cognitive dissonance in-
trinsic in having to choose between two alternatives. We believe that it is possi-
ble to hypothesis an alternative mechanism, maybe complementary to the first, 
according to which the subject in this condition of choice makes an evaluation in 
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line with a principle of the kind: “if I have to change, the change must produce 
an improvement”. In this sense, in the first case the value of the resistance con-
sists in having confirmed an antecedent intention, having acknowledged that the 
alternative would not have caused any further damage (in that it is equivalent). 
The attribution of value by the subject also “rewards” the intelligence of the 
choice made. In the second case, the subject, having succumbed to an alternative 
that is substantially equivalent, makes a negative evaluation thus reducing the 
value of the choice made and declares the non “advantageousness” and non rea-
sonableness of the same.  
As regards the evaluation of regret attributed to the choice made in a condi-
tion of resistance, the results showed that a maximum level of regret was reached 
when the alternative was represented by a prior commitment. This corroborates 
the fact that despite naturally looking for an immediate gratification from their 
actions, social commitment represents a very powerful restricting force that, 
even in conditions of immediate gratification, makes its cogency felt on the sub-
ject and activates feelings of distress, guilt and remorse. In the conditions of 
succumbing the greatest weight of regret is associated to the choice of obligation. 
Even in this case we can observe that the action orientated to an obligation 
“weighs” down the subjects not only in terms of cost but also in terms of regret, 
or rather of a persistent distress regarding the alternative (pleasurable) that he 
has had to renounce (Connolly et al., 1997; Inman et al., 1997; Zeelenberg et al., 
1998; Kivetz & Simonson, 2002; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Mandel, 2003; 
Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004; Ksendzova et al., 2015). 
6. Conclusion 
This study has above all demonstrated that the ratings for cost, regret and value 
associated with a decision can change in the subject according to the subject’s 
awareness of having decided to persevere in his intention of choice while “re-
sisting” another option, or his awareness of having decided to succumb or allow 
himself to be “tempted” by another option. We also associated quality and 
structural specificity to this variable in order to highlight the difference between 
the subjective intentions: a hedonistic choice, a utility choice, a choice condi-
tioned by a social commitment. The comparative analysis (between the scena-
rios) of the post-decisional evaluation, considered separately in the condition of 
resistance and in the condition of succumbing, showed that: when persevering in 
a hedonistic intention, the cost of resistance is greatest when the alternative is a 
prior commitment made previously by the subject, or is significantly higher 
when the choice presents characteristics of utility for the subject; it is less when 
the alternative option is equally pleasurable or when it is an obligation for the 
subject. On the other hand, when the subject succumbs to an option, keeping 
faith to an obligation presents a higher level of cost for the subject respect to all 
the other conditions. The value attributed to a choice of resistance, when the al-
ternative is equally pleasurable, is significantly higher respect to the other situa-
tions; whereas when the subject succumbs to an option that is equally pleasura-
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ble, the value attributed to the choice results significantly lowers respect to all 
the other conditions. In the situation of resistance to an option that foresees 
keeping a prior commitment, the estimated regret is significantly higher than in 
all the other situations. In the situation of succumbing the subject’s regret is sig-
nificantly higher whenever the subject decides to renounce a hedonistic choice 
in the name of an obligation to fulfill. To sum up, the results showed that it does 
not cost much for subjects to evade an obligation for its own sake or from an 
authority in the name of a hedonistic choice, while the pressure coming from the 
thought of having to keep a social commitment is very strong. In general terms, 
we can deduce that the need to fulfill a moral obligation or an obligation to an 
authority does not seem to be the best strategy to induce subjects to activate 
themselves and renounce a position of peaceful hedonism and immediate grati-
fication. This underlines the fact that despite the natural search for immediate 
gratification from their actions, social commitment represents a very powerful 
bond for the subjects, even in conditions of immediate gratification, making its 
cogency felt by activating feelings of regret, guilt and remorse. s 
Of course this research presents a limitation due to the moderate size of the 
sample used. We recommend replicating the study with a larger number of sub-
jects. In this way, it would be possible to understand if some of the conclusions 
of the study can be extended to a more general population. In this research, the 
comparison between the condition of resistance and that of succumbing has 
been evaluated as a stimulus able to produce a change of evaluation attitude in 
the same subject, induced by the alternating identification with a variation of 
decisional scenarios. A future extension of the study could also consider the idea 
of assigning different groups of subjects for the two conditions of resistance and 
succumbing (independent samples). Since the current results have been obtained 
through the comparison between a pleasant antecedent and decision-making al-
ternatives with different characteristics (utility, obligation, social commitment), 
there would still be no study extension with the remaining combinations: utili-
ty-duty; utility-social commitment; obligation-commitment; including their re-
versals and comparisons with their counterparts (utility/utility; obligation/duty; 
social commitment). 
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